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SOCIAL DETERMINANTS
OF HEALTH:
THE IMPACT ON
HEALTH OUTCOMES
AND HOSPITAL
PROFITABILITY
Abstract
Hospitals are experiencing decreasing profitability due to
increasing healthcare cost. In this paper, I demonstrate that
there is financial value to hospitals by addressing social
determinants of health (SDOH) as this strategy improves
health outcomes and yields cost savings. I estimate the impact
of SDOH on the health outcomes using an IV probit regression
analysis and estimated the impact of health outcomes on cost
using a basic linear regression. I estimate that improving
SDOH by one standard deviation will result in hospital cost
savings as follows: addressing Violent Crime will decrease
hospital cost between 0.16% and 0.21%, addressing
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance program will decrease cost
up to 0.5% and addressing Unemployment will decrease
hospital cost between 1.2% and 1.7% resulting in a favorable
impact on hospital profitability. I use the HCUP National
Inpatient Sample 2014 dataset along with externally identified
variables representing SDOH to estimate cost savings.

McPherson, Danielle
DRMCPHERSON@WUSTL.EDU
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I.

Introduction
Healthcare costs have been consistently increasing every year since the

1960s.

They account for nearly 17.5% of GDP as recent as 2018 and they are

on a trajectory to top 20% of GDP by 2025 according to the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS)1. There are several factors that are attributing to
the increases in healthcare costs and the erosion of hospital profitability
including increases in general & administrative expenses, aging patient
population, growing population, and more incidents of disease (Dielman et.al.,
2017). Profitability is also being affected from a revenue perspective due to
decreasing negotiated reimbursement rates

from Commercial (e.g., private,

employer) Payers (i.e., United Healthcare, Humana, Aetna, etc.) as a result of a
shift from Fee-for-Service to Value Based Care models and rate reductions for
services from Government Payers (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid).
Of the total population in the US, the individuals insured by the
Government Payers accounts for the second largest portion of the patient mix for
hospitals behind those that are insured by their employer which are primarily
covered by commercial Payers (see Figure 1).
1

National Health Expenditure Projections 2015-2025: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2015.pdf
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Sources: KFF estimates based on the 2008-2019 American Community Survey, 1-Year Estimates. https://w w w .kff.org/state-category/healthcoverage-uninsured/health-insurance-status/
Employer: Includes those covered through a current or former employer or union, either as policyholder or as dependent
Government: Includes those covered by Medicare, Medicare Advantage, and those w ho have Medicare and another type of non-Medicaid
coverage w here Medicare appears to be the primary payer. Excludes seniors w ho also report employer-sponsored coverage and full-time w ork,
and those covered by Medicare and Medicaid (dual eligibles). Also includes those covered by Medicaid, Medical Assistance, Children's Health
Insurance Plan (CHIP) or any kind of government-assistance plan for those w ith low incomes or a disability, as w ell as those w ho have both
Medicaid and another type of coverage, such as dual eligibles w ho are also covered by Medicare.
Non-Group: Includes those covered by a policy purchased directly from an insurance company, etiher as policyholder or as dependent
Military: Includes those covered under the military or Veterans Administration
Uninsured: Includes those w ithout health insurance and those w ho have coverage under the Indian Health Service only

Employer insured health expenditures have continued to grow consistently since
2013.

According to the 2017 Healthcare Cost and Utilization report (2019),

spending per capita reached $5,641 per person and increased by 16.7 percent
over a five-year period, which was an all-time high for individuals covered by
their employers. Fortunately, hospital reimbursement for services provided to
individuals that are insured by their employers, is sufficient to cover the cost of
care and therefore, does not have a negative impact on hospital profitability
associated with Commercial Payers.
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The number of uninsured people peaked right after the 2008 economic
crisis and began to decrease in 2013 after the Affordable Care Act passed and
was put into effect.

Most of the reduction of the uninsured moved to the

Government insured bucket as Medicare and Medicaid saw increases shortly
after the passing of the Affordable Care act as well.

These two groups include

the oldest population (Medicare) and the poorest population (Medicaid) which
accounts for higher costs per capita compared to individuals covered by their
employers. In 2017, Medicaid reported the median healthcare expenditures per
capita for people covered by Medicaid was $7,171 and $16,544 for people that
were over the age of 65 (Medicaid.gov, n.d.). Unlike those that are insured by
their employers, the hospital reimbursement for services provided to individuals
insured by Government Payers are not enough to cover the cost of care.
Additionally, people covered by Government Payers are primarily low-income and
often do not have the funds to cover any additional out-of-pocket costs (i.e.,
deductibles, coinsurance, copays)

which results in

large

increases

in

uncompensated care (i.e., write-offs) by hospitals.
Currently, hospitals are not being reimbursed sufficiently to cover the cost
of care provided to the patients that are insured by Government Payers and
trends reflect plummeting reimbursement rates for hospital services which adds
to profitability erosion. The reduction in reimbursement rates for Government
Payers are due to legislative restraints enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act
(i.e., Value Based Care programs) and productivity adjustments (Department of
Human Services, 2018).

Figure 2 shows how Medicare and Medicaid
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reimbursement rates for services provided by hospitals are projected to decrease
over the next several years as a percentage of private (Commercial) payers.
Figure 2:

Source: Department of Health and Human Services – CMS Office of the Actuary: https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/2018TRAlternativeScenario.pdf

As the population demographic changes and more and more people are insured
by Government Payers, CMS projects that over 80 percent of hospitals will lose
money by treating Medicare and Medicaid patients. “By the end of the longrange projection period, Medicare and Medicaid payment rates for inpatient
hospital services would both represent roughly 37 percent of the average level
for private health insurance”, (Department of Health and Human Services, 2018)
On the revenue side, Commercial Payers are following the lead of
Government Payers and are shifting from fee-for-service reimbursement models
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to a Value Based Care models.

The fee-for-service model reimburses hospitals

based on the quantity of services they provide and individual patient utilization
and cost, independent of health outcomes. Value Based Care put emphasis on
health outcomes, and focuses on quality of services, population utilization and
costs and incentivizes the hospitals by paying them bonuses for achieving the
agreed upon quality measures through Pay-For-Performance, at-risk and shared
savings arrangements, and penalties (Baker Tilly, 2016). This shift is prompting
the Payers to decrease negotiated reimbursements rates on the front-end and
instead expect hospitals to appropriately manage the care of the patient by
providing high quality service and keeping cost low and being compensated with
bonuses on the backend. However, all hospitals and providers have not fully
adopted the new Value Based model and are still administering care more in line
with fee-for service (Sokol, 2020).

Hospitals are billing procedures (i.e.,

surgeries) based on per units of service or item required for overall procedure
versus pricing more services in bundled payments2 where all procedures are
included in one rate which forces the hospitals to assume more risks.
Additionally, approximately 52.5 percent of hospitals are paying doctors straight
salary and 31.8 percent of hospitals are paying doctors based on their personal
productivity which is consistent with fee-for-service payment models and only
13.1 percent are paid based on the hospital’s financial performance and bonuses
which is consistent with Value Base Care model (Rama, 2018). This is resulting
2

According to the American Hospital Association, “bundled payment programs generally provide a single,
comprehensive payment that covers all of the services involved in a patient's episode of care”
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in lower upfront revenue and increased cost because hospitals have not
strategically kept pace with the direction Payer reimbursement models are going,
and it is creating a large gap between the cost of care and the reimbursement for
care of patients. Figure 3 highlights our current healthcare environment, where
we see healthcare revenue increasing, but at a decreasing rate compared to prior
years.

Also, healthcare cost is increasing at a faster rate than healthcare

revenue. As a result, hospitals are seeing profitability erode.
Figure 3:

Source: Modern Healthcare: https://www.modernhealthcare.com/finance/3-hallmarks-cost-disciplined-health-systemand-profiles-success

Hospitals are running out of ways to increase revenue in their quest to
combat decreased profitability. Simply attempting to negotiate higher rates with
Payers is no longer sufficient. The profitability erosion problem needs to be
addressed through direct medical cost starting with the hospitals. There are
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other areas of a health system3 that attributes to increasing healthcare costs,
but the focus in this paper is hospital care as it accounts for approximately
32.7% of healthcare spending, compared to 15.5% for physician services, 9.2%
for prescription drugs, 4.4% for clinical services, 4.6% for skilled Nursing, 2.8%
for home health care and 15.1% for other personal health care (Rama, 2020).
There appears to be opportunity to decrease hospital cost by focusing on
high-risk chronic patients that are covered by Government Payers because their
reimbursement rates are low and often do not cover the cost of providing the
services. There are many patients that are on Medicaid or Medicare that have
multiple chronic conditions. “While just seventeen percent of Medicare patients
live with more than six chronic conditions, they account for half of all spending
on beneficiaries with chronic disease” (Bresnik, 2016).

Figure 4 shows the

variation in Medicare spending per capita based on the number of chronic
conditions present.

3

Hospitals within the Health System is the focus of this paper. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) defines Health Systems as, “an organization that includes at least one hospital and at least one group of
physicians that provides comprehensive care (including primary and specialty care) who are connected with each other
and with the hospital through common ownership or joint management
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Figure 4:

Source: Health IT Analytics: https://healthitanalytics.com/news/analyzing-medicare-chronic-disease-prevalencespending-rates

Over the years, hospitals have seen costs increase due to patients getting
sicker and older and requiring more emergency room or inpatient hospital stays.
Hospitals could reduce some of the cost by addressing the social determinants
that are causing these high-risk chronic patients to be admitted to the hospital
in the first place.
Per the Centers of Disease Control, conditions in places where people live,
learn, work and play affect a wide range of health risks and outcomes. These
conditions are known as social determinants of health (SDOH). SDOH has
been associated with various causes of health issues over the years.

The

concept of SDOH was first introduced in the 1960’s under President Lyndon B.
Johnson through US Policies designed to declare war on poverty which
introduced Medicaid, Medicare, Welfare (i.e., food stamps), Job Corps and Head
Start Programs (Johnson, 2018 p.5).

The creation of these programs was
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indicative of a correlation between a person’s living environment and their ability
to maintain good health.
This paper aims to test the extent to which SDOH causes unfavorable
health outcomes (evidenced by comorbidities) resulting in higher hospital cost.
Additionally, I show that improving SDOH by one standard deviation will result
in hospital cost savings, thereby, improving profitability. To do this, I regress
hospital cost against comorbidities and specific key control variables (length of
stay, Payer, Hospital Control, Hospital Bed Size and Service Lines) to determine
the incremental cost associated with a patient with comorbidities. I also perform
an instrumental variable probit regression where each comorbidity is regressed
against the three SDOH endogenous variables, Violent Crime, Supplemental
Nutrition Program distribution, and Unemployment while controlling for other
comorbidities, race, gender, household income, and hospital location. Political
Affiliation is used as an instrument in the IV regression since it is correlated with
the SDOH, but uncorrelated with the comorbidities. That incremental cost of
the comorbidity from the linear regression and the causal impact of the SDOH
on the comorbidity from the IV regression is used to calculate the cost savings
generated from improving each SDOH by one standard deviation. I estimate total
hospital cost will decrease between 0.16% and 0.21% for Violent Crime
improvements, up to 0.5% for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
improvements and between 1.2% and 1.7% for unemployment improvements
resulting in a favorable impact on hospital profitability. I also repeat the basic
linear regression on hospital cost and the IV regression on the comorbidities on
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a subset of the dataset that consists of all observations containing DRG 470 –
Major Joint Replacement without Major Complications. This micro analysis is
done to determine if the correlation and causation of SDOH to hospital cost is
still present.
This paper is organized as follows:

The second section summarizes

previous empirical and theoretical research related to eroding hospital
profitability and the impact on SDOH on health outcomes. The third section
presents detail on the primary source data used to analyze the relationships of
health outcomes and SDOH. The fourth section presents the data methods used
including the econometric models and the cost savings calculations. The fifth
section describes the empirical results. Section six suggests future research
possibilities because of some of the constraints of the dataset. The seventh
section discusses how health systems can change processes and influence
policies to implement initiatives to improve SDOH resulting in improved
profitability. Section 8 is the conclusion.

II.

Literature Review
In this section, I review some literature related to hospital profitability and

its erosion over time. Additionally, I review previous research that focuses on
Medicaid patients or low-income patients and how treatment of those patients
correlates to decreasing profitability
Hospital Profitability
Hospitals have been faced with finding ways to stay profitable for all lines
of business. Bai and Anderson (2016) measure profitability as the net income
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from patient care services per adjusted discharge based on fiscal year 2013.
Their study shows that 46% of hospitals are not profitable, and unprofitability
of hospitals are more sensitive to not-for-profit hospitals and hospitals that treat
a larger percentage of Medicare, Medicaid, and uninsured patients. Freidman,
Sood, Engstrom and McKenzie (2004) also studied hospital profitability for
inpatient care by payer and noted that Medicaid was the least profitable
compared to Medicare, Private Insurance, and self-pay.
Additionally, since over half the states participated in the Medicaid
expansion, the total number of Medicaid members grew, but the reimbursement
to hospitals for patient care did not. “The largest public payers continue to
underpay hospitals, data from the most recent American Hospital Association
(AHA)

Annual

Survey

of

Hospitals

revealed.

Medicare

and

Medicaid

reimbursement fell $76.8 billion short of the actual costs of treating beneficiaries
in 2017. Medicare reimbursement was $53.9 billion short of actual hospital
costs, while Medicaid underpaid hospitals by about $22.9 billion” (Lapoint,
2019). Medicaid pays between $0.85 to $0.87 on the dollar from 2010-2018 for
all charges incurred at the hospital.

With the growing number of Medicare

patients (approximately 10,000 newly eligible people aging in per day) and the
increased number of Medicaid patients and newly insured, low income, and
exchange patients, hospitals are not seeing as many commercial patients in the
ER or as inpatient admits (Deloitte Insights, 2018).
Many of the high cost charges were being generated by the lowest
reimbursed part of the business (Medicaid). Therefore, some hospitals negotiate
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higher rates on commercial business, expecting the excess amounts to
compensate for the low reimbursement for Medicaid Patients (Barkholz, 2016).
Wagner (2015) research highlights how the Medicaid expansion led to higher
prices and how hospital administrators thought they would have to charge
patients with private/commercial insurance enough to cover their services and
the deficit generated by Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement.

There was a

shifting from private insurance to Medicaid resulting in revenue losses holding
patient mix constant. However, that shift does not support an increase in
privately covered patients, noting cost shifting is not occurring in response to
Medicaid Expansions.

Instead, they reduce charges for privately insured

patients, causing privately insured to benefit from the Medicaid expansions in
terms of hospital charges.

This is evidence that there must be other ways

hospitals are addressing revenue losses caused by Medicaid Expansions.
Social Determinants of Health
There is a significant amount of prior research that shows a connection
between an individual’s socioeconomic status or certain social determinants of
health and their health outcomes. As it relates to a person’s income status,
Lenhart (2017) research finds that higher wages result in lower overall mortality
and lower income individuals have been more prone to death from their health
issues. When care is free of charge or there is no out-of-pocket cost to the
patient, individuals increase their number of doctor visits by 5-10% (Nilsson and
Paul, 2018), thereby increasing their chances of mitigating potentially
devastating health issues.

There has been some difficulties in determining
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causation between socioeconomic status and health outcomes which resulted in
some literature taking some different approaches to find causation. Allin and
Stable (2012) research finds that effects of the socioeconomic status also could
pass down to the children of the parents, causing them to suffer the same
adverse health outcomes as their parents. Additionally, the upward mobility of
the child can be beneficial to the parent, and that parents, with both high and
low socioeconomic status, can benefit from having a child with a high
socioeconomic status (Zimmer, Hanson, Smith, 2016).
Another SDOH is residential segregation which focuses on the geographic
location of the person. People in poorer neighborhoods are documented to have
significantly more ambulatory visits for ambulatory care sensitive conditions
than people that live in more affluent neighborhoods (Roos, et al, 2005). Other
studies have looked at the variation of health gaps that exist across more
developed and richer countries and have shown that low socioeconomic statuses
lead to poorer health versus poor health leading to low socioeconomic status in
richer more developed countries (Lleras-Muney, 2018). This further supports
the idea that where a person lives can have a negative effect on their health
outcomes.
There are also studies that link a person’s race/ethnicity and
socioeconomic status to their health outcomes. There are studies that correlate
“white privilege” to better health outcomes by looking at body mass index (BMI)
and associating the greater BMI of people with darker complexions to lower
socioeconomic statuses and poorer health (Carson, 2015). In some cases, a

P a g e | 14

hospital’s profitability would be affected if they took into consideration the
sensitivities of racially and ethnically diverse individuals.

For example, the

Hospital Readmission Reduction program of the Centers of Medicare and
Medicaid Services assess penalties for hospital readmissions and studies found
that after adding race/ethnicity along with low socioeconomic status of
individuals into the readmissions penalty calculation, most hospital would see
significant decreases to their penalty payments (Martsolf, et al, 2016). This study
opens the opportunity for other studies to look at sensitivities of race/ethnicity
as it relates to risk adjustment for other areas.
There has been some progress with hospitals investing in social
determinants of health, however it is not clear that there was a clear connection
between that investment and their profitability. Horwitz et.al. (2020) discusses
the “sizable” investments in social determinants of health by health systems, but
also recognizes that those investments are not specific to community-based
activities. Many of those investments are health related and does not go too far
beyond that, despite the ACA regulations that required tax exempt hospitals to
do community needs assessments.
My research will build on these findings and discuss how improving social
determinants of health of individuals and can result in both better health
outcomes and higher profitability for hospitals.
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III.

Data Sources

Primary Data Source
I use the 2014 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 4 National
Inpatient Sample (NIS) which is sampled from the State Inpatient Database (SID)
and accounts for all inpatient data submitted to and reported by HCUP as the
primary source for the population I analyze. “The NIS is a database of hospital
inpatient stays derived from billing data submitted by hospitals to statewide data
organizations across the U.S. These inpatient data include clinical and resource
use information typically available from discharge abstracts. Researchers and
policy makers use the NIS to make national estimates of health care utilization,
access, charges, quality, and outcomes. The NIS covers all patients, including
individuals covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance, and the
uninsured. For Medicare, the NIS includes Medicare Advantage patients, a
population that is missing from Medicare claims data but that comprises as
much as 20 percent of Medicare beneficiaries. The NIS' large sample size enables
analyses of rare conditions, uncommon treatments, and special patient
populations” (Introduction to The HCUP National Inpatient Sample, 2014, p. 4).
The details of the NIS are normally available to the public through HCUP

approximately 3 years in arrears. For example, the 2017 NIS Sample was just
made available on September 1, 2020.

Therefore, at the time I began this

research, the 2014 NIS Dataset was the most complete version of data to use at
4

Detailed information on The HCUP National Inpatient Sample (NIS) 2014 can be found at http://www.hcupus.ahrq.gov
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that time. The NIS was redesigned in 2012 to improve the national estimates.
This dataset was the last version of the NIS that only included the ICD-9-CM
diagnosis and procedure codes (in 2015 the ICD-10 CM diagnosis and procedure
codes were introduced).

Additionally, it included inpatient discharge data for

the state of Maine, after not being included for the prior two years. The hospital
service line (discussed later) was also added as a new data element in 2014.
This dataset includes 7,071,062 total observations of inpatient discharge
data. My analysis looks at all observations but focus on select data elements as
the base of my research. Unfortunately, all data elements were not provided for
every observation, which resulted in some missing data and omitted data during
the regression because of collinearity.

However, the amount of missing or

omitted data was not significant enough to materially impact my results (which
will be discussed later).
The independent variables are the 29 comorbidities identified in the
dataset. Comorbidities, as defined by Valderas, et.al (2009), “the presence of
more than 1 distinct condition in an individual”.

All the comorbidities are

presented in the dataset as binary where 1 indicates that the comorbidity is
present and 0 indicates the comorbidity is not present. These comorbidities
included in Figure 5:
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Figure 5
Comorbidity
AIDS
ALCOHOL ABUSE
DEFICIENCY ANEMIA
RHEUMATOID ARTHRITIS
CHRONIC BLOOD LOSS ANEMICA
CONGRESTIVE HEART FAILURE
CHRONIC PULMONARY DISEASE
COAGULOPATHY
DEPRESSION
DIABETES
DIABETES W/ CHRONIC COMPLICATIONS
DRUG ABUSE
HYPERTENSION
HYPOTHYROIDISM
LIVER DISEASE
LYMPHOMA
FLUID & ELECTROLYTE DISORDERS
METASTATIC CANCER
OTHER NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS
OBESITY
PARALYSIS
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISDORDERS
PSYCHOSES
PULMONARY CIRUCLATION DISORDERS
RENAL FAILURE
SOLID TUMOR WITHOUT METASTASIS
PEPTIC ULCER DISEASE
VALVULAR DISEASE
WEIGHT LOSS

Dataset Name
CM_AIDS
CM_ALCOHOL
CM_ANEMDEF
CM_ARTH
CM_BLDLOSS
CM_CHF
CM_CHRNLUNG
CM_COAG
CM_DEPRESS
CM_DM
CM_DMCX
CM_DRUG
CM_HTN_C
CM_HYPOTHY
CM_LIVER
CM_LYMPH
CM_LYTES
CM_METS
CM_NEURO
CM_OBESE
CM_PARA
CM_PERIVASC
CM_PSYCH
CM_PULMCIRC
CM_RENLFAIL
CM_TUMOR
CM_ULCER
CM_VALVE
CM_WGHTLOSS

The control variables originally presented in the dataset were a mixture of
continuous and categorical variables (except for the comorbidities). Length of
Stay (LOS) represents the amount of days a patient stays in the hospital after
being admitted. The LOS was added as a control variable because of its direct
impact to hospital COST.

According to the Organization of Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD), “The average length of stay in hospitals
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(ALOS) is often used as an indicator of efficiency. All other things being equal, a
shorter stay will reduce the cost per discharge and shift care from inpatient to
less expensive post-acute settings” (OCED, 2020). The LOS was originally a
continuous variable that ranges from 1 to 365 days. I reclassified the LOS to 7
binary variables (0-4 days, 5-9 days, 10-14 days, 15-19 days, 20-24 days, 25-29
days and 30 plus days) where 1 indicates the hospital stay falls within the
variable’s specified days and 0 indicates it does not fall within those days. I
group the LOS into those specific categories since 99.1% of all inpatient stays
happen in the first 30 days.
Hospital Control is another data element used as a control variable in the
first regression.

Hospital Control is defined as the type of entity that has

ownership of the hospital. This data element was added as a control variable
because research has shown that hospital ownership has a significant impact
on hospital profitability. Based on prior empirical research, there appears to be
significant differences in financial performance of for-profit (private) hospitals
and not-for profit hospitals (Shen, et.al., 2007). In the data set, Hospital Control
was originally presented as a categorical element where 1 indicated the hospital
was owned by government or non-federal, 2 indicates private, non-profit
ownership and 3 indicates private, investor-owned ownership.

These 3

categories were reclassified to 3 separate binary variables for each Hospital
Control type where 1 indicates ownership/control for the respective Hospital
Control type and 0 represents no ownership/control.
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Hospital Bed Size is also a data element used as a control variable in the
first regression. I view the bed size of the hospital as its capacity to take on
patients which could be revenue generating. However, smaller hospitals may not
have the same opportunity as larger hospitals to reap benefits of profitable lines
of business and are not able to spread inpatient cost over a large amount of
hospital beds. Therefore, it is important to see the variation between the bed
size of the hospital. In the data set, the hospital bed sizes varied across 4 regions
(Northeast, Midwest, Southern and Western) and was further measured by
Hospital Location (described later).5 Therefore, what is considered small, medium
and large in the Northeast Region may not be measured the same as it is in the
Midwest region.

Hospital Bed Size was originally presented as a categorical

element where 1 indicated a small number of hospital beds, 2 indicated a
medium number of hospital beds and 3 indicated a large amount of hospital bed.
I reclassified these 3 categories of bed size into 3 different binary variables where
1 indicate the observation is that bed size (small, medium, or large) and 0
indicates it is not.
Payer is a data element used as a control variable in the first regression.
Payer represents the primary expected payer of the patient’s hospital bills. This
can include a private insurance company, government insurance or the actual
patient which may be responsible for the hospital bill if they do not have health
insurance. The specific payer type can tell you a lot about the patient including
5

Detailed breakdown of Small, Medium, Large bed sizes are available at https://www.hcupus.ahrq.gov/db/vars/hosp_bedsize/nisnote.jsp
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their socio-economic status, which is critical in analyzing how that affects
hospital cost and health outcomes. In the data set, Payer was originally
presented as a categorical element where 1 indicated the patient was covered by
Medicare, 2 indicated the patient was covered by Medicaid, 3 indicated the
patient was covered by a private insurance including HMO (normally coverage
offered by an employer), 4 indicated the self-pay and the patient is responsible,
5 indicated no charge (unreimbursed Native Health), and 6 indicated the patient
was covered by other types of insurances (i.e., Workers Compensation,
CHAMPUS/VA, Indian Health Service, other government insurance).

I

reclassified these 6 categories of Payers into 6 different binary variables where 1
indicates the responsible party for the patient’s hospital bill is that of the variable
(i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) and 0 indicates it is not.
Lastly, I used the data element Service Line as a control variable for the
first regression. I added Service Line because all reasons for hospitalizations are
not monolithic and each reason has its own unique impact to overall hospital
profitability. Service Line represents all discharges from the hospital and was
originally presented in the dataset as a categorical element of hospitalization
types

where

1

indicated

maternal/neonatal,

2

indicated

mental

health/substance abuse, 3 indicated injury, 4 indicated surgical and 5 indicated
medical.

I reclassified each category into its own binary variable where 1

indicated that the observation’s service line was the specific type specified (i.e.,
maternal/neonatal, injury, surgical, etc.) and 0 indicated that it was not.
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The second regression went further to explain whether there is any type of
impact to hospital COST because of a patient’s SDOH. There have been several
studies as noted in the Literature Review section, that discussed the correlation
between

an

circumstances.

individual’s

health

outcomes

and

their

socioeconomic

The impact of an individual’s socioeconomic status on their

health outcomes can be directly driven by an individual’s personal decisions
such as choosing to forgo medications or follow-up doctor appointments due to
their low-income status and not having the available funds to cover out-of-pocket
costs (i.e., copays, deductibles, etc.) (Nilsson and Paul, 2018). The impact on
health outcomes can also be indirectly driven by circumstances outside of an
individual’s control such as the lack of access to grocery stores to obtain fresh
nutritious food or living in a neighborhood with little to no access to healthcare
providers (Lleras-Muney, 2018).

I selected comorbidities to represent an

individual’s health outcome because comorbidities are a combination of multiple
related diseases and diagnoses of an individual.

SDOH are combination of

several socioeconomic factors that could also be related to a person’s health
outcome based on prior research.
This regression was more complex as I needed to look at the impact of the
social determinants on all 29 comorbidities separately as dependent variables
and with each social determinant as independent variables separately as well,
while controlling for Race, Household Income, Hospital Location and other
comorbidities that were not being analyzed as the dependent variable.
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I had to look beyond the dataset elements to explore this assumption
because SDOH were not captured at the point of admission for an inpatient
hospital stay and therefore, the information is not reported in the NIS as of 2014.
In 2019, CMS introduced some ICD-10-CM diagnosis codes that could be used
to identify certain types of SDOH such as problems related to education,
problems related to employment and unemployment, occupational exposure to
risk factors, problems relates to physical environment, problems related to
housing and economic circumstances, problems related to social environment
and

problems

related

to

psychosocial

circumstances

(James,

2019).

Unfortunately, this information was not collected in 2014 and is not consistently
captured now. Therefore, I had to create the variables using external information
obtained from various sources. My focus is on a patient’s living environment,
food insecurities, and issues surrounding employment. I obtained information
on Violent Crime to analyze the living environment, gathered information on
distribution of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP) to analyze food
insecurities and the unemployment rates to analyze issues around employment.
All the amounts used to analyze the effects of the SDOH are grouped into the
nine US Census divisions of the hospital as referenced in the HCUP 2014 NIS
dataset. Each division includes the specific states the US Census assigned based
on geographical area. I group the SDOH by hospital division because trends and
practice patterns vary across the United States and the division is the most
detailed level to stratify the inpatient data I use for this research. Therefore, the
SDOH amounts could only be 1 of 9 values as shown in Appendix 1.
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Violent Crime Rate was obtained from the FBI Crime in the United States
by Region, Geographic Division, and State 2013-2014 Table 4. Per this source
data, violent crime is defined as murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault. I present the value of violent crime as the
average number of incidents per 100,000 people at the Hospital Division level
(as defined by the NIS dataset) as a categorical variable. I use an average number
of incidents because the information included on the FBI report was for the time
from July 2013 through June 2014.
SNAP values were obtained from the USDA Food and Nutrition Services
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program State Activity Report Fiscal Year
2014. I use the average monthly benefit per household from Table 2 of the report.
The average amounts were presented in the report at the state level and I
reclassify each state into the average monthly benefit per household at the
Hospital Division level (as defined by the NIS dataset) and present as a
categorical variable.
Unemployment rates were obtained from the Kaiser Family Foundation
State Health Facts as of September 2014.

The unemployment rates are based

on the overall population of individuals that are 16 years or older and are
considered employable and actively looking for work. The unemployment rates
are presented in the report at the state level and I reclassify each state into the
Hospital Division level (as defined by the NIS dataset) and presented it as a
categorical variable.
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Race, Gender, Household Income and Hospital Location were all data
elements available in the NIS dataset.

I selected these data elements to be

control variables because they help identify the patient’s socioeconomic status
and environment.
Race represents the race of the patient at the time of hospitalization. Race
was originally presented as a categorical variable in the NIS dataset, but was
only available for about 94% of the observations (approximately 6% of the Race
data was missing). The race categories were classified as 1 for white, 2 for black,
3 for Hispanic, 4 for Asian or Pacific Islander, 5 for Native American and 6 for
other.

I reclassify these categories into separate binary variables where 1

indicated the patient was of that race identified by the variable (i.e., black, white,
etc.) and 0 indicated that they were not. All the missing variables defaulted to
the Other race data element.
Gender represents whether the patient is a male or a female. Gender was
already presented as a binary variable where 1 indicates female and 0 indicates
male.
Household Income represents the median household income quartiles
based on the patients’ zip code. Household income was originally presented as a
categorical data elements where 1 indicated households with incomes of $1 to
$38,999, 2 indicated households with incomes of $39,000 to $47,999, 3
indicated households with incomes of $48,000 to $62,999 and 4 indicated
households with incomes of $63,000 or more.

I reclassify each household
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income category into separate binary variables where 1 indicated the patient’s
household income identified by the variable (i.e., $1 to $38,999, $63,000, etc.)
and 0 indicates that the patient’s household income was not that specific
category.
Hospital Location represents the type of location (urban or rural) and the
teaching status of the hospital that the patient was admitted to. I chose hospital
location versus the location of the patient’s residence because I believe it better
represents how the hospital is impacted by treating patients affected by the
SDOH. The Hospital Location was originally presented as a categorical data
element where 1 indicated rural, 2 indicated urban/non-teaching and 3
indicated urban/teaching. As with the other control variables, I reclassify each
hospital location category into its own separate binary variable where 1 indicate
the patient’s hospital is in that specific location identified by the variable (i.e.,
rural, urban/teaching, etc.) and 0 indicates that the hospital is not in that
specified location.

IV.

Data Method

Econometric Model
My analysis has two parts, the first part looks at the influence of
comorbidities on hospital cost while controlling for length of stay, hospital
control, hospital bed-size, payer (insurance) type, and service line. The second
part of the analysis explores if and to what extent SDOH cause those
comorbidities and as a result, attributed to increases in hospital costs. The first
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part analysis consists of one dependent variable (COST). The calculate variable
COST is a formula based on total billed charges included in data set deflated by
average cost to charge ratio6.

My primary assumption is that SDOH (SDOH)

contributes to comorbidities (CM) which causes hospital inpatient cost (COST)
to increase and profitability to erode. So, my goal is to determine if there are
cost savings to the hospital if the SDOH improved by one standard deviation. To
further explore this assumption, I perform two regression analyses, one linear
regression and one instrumental variable regression and calculate potential
savings based on improving the SDOH by one standard deviation. The first
regression determines to what extent CMs affect COST while controlling for
Length of Stay (LOSDAYS_*), Hospital Control (H_CONTRL_*), Hospital Bed Size
(HOSP_BEDSIZE_*), Payer (PAY1_*), Services Line (SERVICELINE_*) and all
comorbidities (CM_*). The linear regression’s construction is as follows:
Y= β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i + ……. βnXni + u
Where:
Y = COST
X1 – X7 = Length of Stay variables
X8 - X13= Payer variables
X14 - X16= Hospital Control variables
X17 - X19= Hospital Bed Size variables

6

Cost to Charge Ratio = total Billed charges/total allowable cost
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X20 - X24= Service Line variables
X20 - X48= All the comorbidities variables
u = error term
In the second regression, I explore the factors behind the comorbidities
because per the assumption above, I believe at some level, SDOH causes an
individual’s comorbidities along with other control variables. I regress the three
SDOH variables (i.e., Violent Crime, SNAP, and Unemployment) and all 29
comorbidities and controlled for Race, Gender, Income Level, and Hospital
Location.

Since the comorbidities are binary and are also the dependent

variables, the regression would be a probit regression.
To account for the potential endogeneity problem, I use an Instrumental
Variable (IV) approach.

To further exploit the SDOH, I needed to identify a

unique variable that would help me isolate the piece of the SDOH that is
uncorrelated with the error term but is correlated with SDOH. To do this, I would
need to do an instrumental variables regression (IV).

I selected Political

Affiliation of the region of all patients in the data set as the IV instrument
because it is correlated with the SDOH directly through legislation that
determines socioeconomic outcomes as a result of laws passed or indirectly
through legislation or policy that are heavily influenced by the dominant Political
Affiliation of the patient’s region. Political Affiliation fulfills all OLS assumptions
including the instrumental variable (IV) assumption of instrument relevance and
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instrument exogeneity because it correlates to SDOH, but it is not driven by the
individual’s comorbidity.
Political Affiliation (i.e., Democrat, Republican) serves as a proxy for
governmental policies reflected in the geographic division of which the SDOH are
identified. Often the policies that are in place are swayed by the position of the
political affiliation that is dominant in that area. For example, Democrat leaning
areas may favor more government funding which would result in having a larger
amount of average SNAP distributions per household. Also, Republican leaning
areas may favor policies that discourage government spending and executive
overreach which a lot of times includes financial assistance that may help
disenfranchised communities at large and could result in higher levels of
unemployment. Democrats and Republicans have varying views on crime as
well, ranging from demanding harsher penalties for offenders (Republicans) to
being in favor of police reform because of over-policing (Democrats). SNAP’s
distribution amounts are directly determined by governmental policies since the
household allocation amounts and requirements around how those amounts are
distributed, are voted on and decided by a specific state’s elected officials.
Unemployment is indirectly caused by government policies but are heavily
impacted by government policies such as monetary policy, fiscal policy,
outsourcing, etc. Violent Crime is partially driven by government policy and
partially by sociological circumstances.
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Political Affiliation is determined by the classification of the legislative
composition in each state in 2014 per the National Conference of State
Legislatures Partisan Composition of State Legislatures in 2014. States were
identified as Democrat, Republican or Split and were given values of 1, 2 or 3,
respectively. All states were reclassified based on the hospital divisions per the
NIS dataset. I took the legislative composition value (1, 2 or 3) by state and
calculate the average legislative composition value by division. To determine the
Political Affiliation at the division level, I create a binary variable where any
division average that is less than 2 is assigned 1 (Democrat) and averages over 2
are assigned 0 (Republican).
Political Affiliation is correlated with the SDOH variables and is not
correlated with the error term as evidenced by the Wald test of exogeneity. As a
result, the second regression should be an IVProbit regression as follows:
Y= β0 + β1Xi + β2W1i + β2W2i + β3W3i + ……. βnWni + u7
Where:
Y = Comorbidity (for each selected CM per regression there are separate
regressions where the individual CM is the dependent variable)

7

The TSLS estimator in the IVProbit regression is done in 2 stages. In the first stage I regress X on instrumental
Variable Z (Political Affiliation). In the second stage I regress Y from the IVProvbit Regression TSLS on the predicted
values and the included exogenous variables (W) using OLS including the intercept. Please note, in the software used
to do regressions, these steps are performed simultaneously.
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Xi = SDOH – Endogenous Variable (using instrument Z such that Xi =
π0 + πZ1i + πW1i + πW1i + πW1i + πW1i + πW1i + vi, where Z = Political
Affiliation
W1i – W6i = Race variables
W7i = Gender variables
W8i – W11i = Household Income variables
W12i - W14i = Hospital Location variables
W15i

–

W42i = All Other 28 CMs (not including the CM selected as the

dependent variable.
u = error term
The second regression requires each CM to be a dependent variable and
be regressed against each SDOH in separate IVProbit regressions.
Cost Savings Results
Next, I determine to what extent overall hospital COST could be reduced if
the SDOH improved by one standard deviation for Violent Crime, Unemployment
and SNAP. Improving Violent Crime by one standard deviation means that the
average number of incidents of violent crime per 100,000 people will decrease
resulting in less violent crime.

Improving Unemployment by one standard

deviation would mean that average unemployment rate would decrease. For the
comorbidities that cause COST to increase and that are caused by Violent Crime
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or Unemployment (both represented by positive coefficients), the improvement
by one standard deviation (also positive) will result in cost savings. Improving
SNAP by one standard deviation represent an increase in the average amount of
SNAP funds per household which would ultimately decrease the level of food
insecurity. To reflect the effect on cost savings, I switch the sign of the standard
deviation when calculating the COST savings because an improvement by one
standard deviation has an inverse effect on the SNAP distribution.

For the

comorbidities that both caused COST to increase and that are caused by
circumstances around SNAP (i.e., food insecurity), the improvement by one
standard deviation will determine the cost savings.
I calculate the standard deviations for each SDOH variable. To do this I
use the average number of Violent Crime incidents, the average distribution per
household for SNAP and the average Unemployment rate by Hospital Division8
and calculate the standard deviation for each SDOH across all nine divisions for
the full dataset. Next, I take the coefficient for each SDOH variable from each
CM IV Probit regression which represents the likelihood or probability that an
individual with that SDOH (i.e., that lives in an area with Violent Crime) will also
suffer from the specific CM (dependent variable) and multiply it by the one
standard deviation for the SDOH variable.

This tells me the portion of the

standard deviation improvement directly tied to the CM that is caused by the
8

The dataset only went as granular as the Division which resulted in the Standard Deviation being artificially
constrained as the SDOH amounts could only be one of 9 numbers.
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SDOH. Next, I use summary statistics to identify the total number of individuals
with each CM by tabulating each CM from the full dataset and multiplying it by
the portion of the standard deviation improvement directly tied to the CM. This
results in the total number of people with the CM that is caused by the SDOH,
of which an improvement by one standard deviation would affect.

Lastly, I

multiply the total number of people affected by the SDOH by the CM coefficient
from the first regression which shows the CM’s effect on COST, to determine
potential dollar savings. This full calculation is outlined below in Table 1:
Table 1
1 st Stage Cost Regression

2 nd Stage Regression - Instrumental Variables

Comorbidity
Coeffient

Total # of people
with CM (full
Dataset)

P value
P >|t|

Violent
Crime
Standard
Deviation

IVP robit Crime
Coeffic ient

P value
P >|t|

a

b

9 5 % C. I .

c

d

9 5 % C. I .

Comorbidity

V.

Total # of
Total
P eople with CM
improvement
assoc iated with
direc tly tied
P otential
to this CM
Savings
e = c *d

f = e*b

High Level
Savings at
Comorbidity
Level
g = a*f

Results from Empirical Research

COST Regression
I show there is an impact on hospital COST caused by the comorbidities
while holding Length of Stay, Payer, Hospital Control, Hospital Bed Size and
Service Line constant. There are favorable and unfavorable effects on COST
savings from the comorbidities. The coefficient of the comorbidities that are
positive indicates an unfavorable effect on COST and represented the
incremental COST increase that results from a person having that specific
comorbidity. Figure 6 includes the coefficients of the Comorbidity with adverse
effect on COST.
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Figure 6:
Comorbidity

CM Coeff

CM_ALCOHOL

188.25

CM_BLDLOSS

1,255.49

CM_CHF

127.07

CM_CHRNLUNG

364.48

CM_COAG

5,385.73

CM_DM

103.94

CM_DRUG

203.86

CM_LIVER

496.63

CM_LYMPH

923.55

CM_LYTES

2,216.55

CM_NEURO

428.35

CM_OBESE

466.71

CM_PARA

207.29

CM_PERIVASC

98.37

CM_PULMCIRC

2,236.82

CM_RENLFAIL

426.56

CM_ULCER

916.04

CM_WGHTLOSS

1,677.10

All comorbidity coefficients have p-values at or below 0.01.

There are also

comorbidities that do not individually cause COST to increase while holding all
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other variables constant.

Figure 7 includes these comorbidities and their

coefficients.
Figure 7:
Comorbidity

CM Coeff

CM_ANEMDEF

-342.881

CM_DEPRESS

-449.842

CM_DMCX

-654.92

CM_HTN_C

-46.3697

CM_HYPOTHY

-219.577

CM_METS

-347.715

CM_PSYCH

-665.955

CM_TUMOR

-313.949

These comorbidities are also statistically significant with p-value less than 0.01.
It is important to note these additional comorbidities also plays a role in overall
hospital COST impact since people with comorbidities must have at least two.
This means that the COST of one comorbidity may be offset by the other or
combined with another comorbidity.
The results of this first regressions shows that comorbidities are a
contributing factor in causing hospital COST to increase and negatively
impacting hospital profitability.
Instrumental Variable Probit Regression and Savings Calculation
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The second regression is the instrumental variables probit (IVPROBIT). I
look to see if the SDOH (Violent Crime, SNAP, and Unemployment) causes the
comorbidities that have the statistically significant adverse effect on COST. I
note that the three SDOH variables have a statistically significant impact on the
following comorbidities with p-value less than 0.05: Alcohol, Congestive Heart
Failure, Chronic Pulmonary disease, Coagulopathy, Depression, Diabetes
without

complications,

Diabetes

with

complications,

Hypertension,

Hypothyroidism, Liver Disease, Lymphoma, Fluid and Electrolyte Disorders,
Metastatic Cancer, Neurological Disorders, Obesity, Paralysis, Peripheral
Vascular Disorder, Psychoses, Pulmonary Circulation, Renal Failure, Solid
Tumor with Metastasis, Peptic Ulcer Disease and Weight Loss.
To determine the estimated cost savings, calculated based on improving
SDOH by one standard deviation, I split the cost savings into two categories. The
first category is direct COST savings which includes the calculated savings based
on the specific comorbidities that has both a positive SDOH coefficient and a
positive comorbidity coefficient.

Since both coefficients go in the same positive

direction, the impact of the SDOH on the comorbidity flows through the
comorbidity to COST, thus reflecting the COST savings attributed specifically to
those comorbidities and SDOH variables. The second category is Total Savings
which includes the sum of all calculated cost savings for all statistically
significant comorbidities.

As stated above, comorbidities are not mutually

exclusive, therefore, it is important to include the net sum of all statistically
significant comorbidities which would include some that do not have the same
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positive directional effect on COST.

I present the calculated cost savings in

dollars and as a percentage of total cost ($75,469,829,306.87) from the dataset.
This enables me to highlight the full range of COST Savings that can be realized
if the SDOH is improved by one standard deviation of 79.01795, 24.90658, and
0.0082279 for Violent Crime, SNAP, and Unemployment, respectively.
For Violent Crime (Appendix 2), the comorbidities that have positive
comorbidity and SDOH coefficients are Coagulopathy, Diabetes without
complication, Electrolyte Disorder and Weight Loss. Based on the total number
of people with these comorbidities and improving violent crime by one standard
deviation, I calculate the COST savings full range to be $119,514,400 through
$160,967,652, where the $161M is the direct COST savings related to the four
comorbidities that have positive comorbidity and SDOH coefficients and the
$119.5M is the total COST savings. Since the full range cost savings amounts
are all positive, this indicates that if violent crime improves by one standard
deviation, total hospital cost will decrease between 0.16% (total) and 0.21%
(direct) and will result in a favorable impact on hospital profitability.
For SNAP (Appendix 3), there are more comorbidities that have positive
comorbidity and SDOH coefficients. These comorbidities are Alcohol, Congestive
Heart Failure, Chronic Pulmonary Disease, Drugs Abuse, Liver Disease,
Lymphoma, Neurological Disorders, Obesity, Paralysis, Peripheral Vascular
Disorder, Pulmonary Circulation, Renal Failure, and Peptic Ulcer Disease.
Based on total number of people with these comorbidities and improving SNAP
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by one standard deviation, I calculate the COST savings full range to be $203,904,405 through $368,063,384 where the -$204M is the direct COST
savings related to the thirteen comorbidities that have positive comorbidity and
SDOH coefficients and the $368M is the total COST savings.

The directly

impacted comorbidities do not seem to result in any COST savings, however, the
net effect of the range seems to reflect favorable COST savings. Therefore I
determine that since the full range cost savings amounts are all positive, this
indicates that if SNAP distributions improve by one standard deviation, total
hospital cost will decrease up to 0.5% (total) and will result in a favorable impact
on hospital profitability, but only if all comorbidities are taken into account.9
For Unemployment (Appendix 4), the comorbidities that have positive
comorbidity and SDOH coefficients are the same as the ones identified for Violent
Crime (Coagulopathy, Diabetes without complication, Electrolyte Disorder and
Weight Loss). Based on the total number of people with these comorbidities and
improving unemployment by one standard deviation, I calculate the potential
COST savings full range to be $930,589,828 through $1,252,670,559, where the
$1.3B is the direct COST savings related to the four comorbidities that have
positive comorbidity and SDOH coefficients and the $930M is the total COST
savings. As with violent crime, since the full range cost savings amounts are all
positive, this indicates that if unemployment improves by one standard
9

It is important to note that calculation for increasing by one standard deviation is adding to the average SNAP
distribution per household so the calculation for standard deviation is a negative amount.
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deviation, total hospital cost will decrease between 1.2% (total) and 1.7% (direct)
and will result in a favorable impact on hospital profitability.
Wald Test of Exogeneity
To determine if the SDOH variables cause hospital COST to increase
through the comorbidities, I run an instrumental variables regression (called
IVPROBIT in Stata). I suspect the SDOH variables are correlated with the error
term and I use Political Affiliation as an instrument to isolate the piece of the
SDOH variables that are uncorrelated with the error term.

The Wald Test of

Exogeneity determines whether the instrumented variables are exogenous to the
error term.

The goal of this test is to tell us if it is appropriate to use an

instrumental variables regression over a regular probit regression.

The null

hypothesis for the Wald Test of Exogeneity is that the instrumented variable (i.e.,
Violent Crime, SNAP or Unemployment) is not endogenous, therefore there would
be no need to run an instrumental variables regression using Political Affiliation
as the instrument.

If I reject the null hypothesis, that indicates that the

instrumented variables are endogenous to the error term and the use of the
Political Affiliation instrument was appropriate, therefore the IVProbit regression
was appropriate.
Based on the instrumental variables regressions for Violent Crime, SNAP
and

Unemployment

that

have

statistically

significant

impact

on

the

comorbidities that are identified as having direct COST savings, I am able to
reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for all Violent Crime and
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Unemployment regressions for the 4 effected comorbidities (Coagulopathy,
Diabetes without Complication, Electrolyte Disorder and Weight Loss). I also
reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for SNAP for all of the effected
comorbidities (Alcohol, Congestive Heart Failure, Chronic Pulmonary Disease,
Drugs Abuse, Liver Disease, Lymphoma, Neurological Disorders, Obesity,
Paralysis, Peripheral Vascular Disorder, Pulmonary Circulation, and Renal
Failure) except for Peptic Ulcer Disease. Since the chi2 value (p-value) for Peptic
Ulcer Disease is greater than 0.05, this suggests that SNAP is not correlated with
the error term and that a normal probit regression should be used. I run a probit
regression with Peptic Ulcer disease as the dependent variable and SNAP being
the independent variable along with the same control variables that are used in
the IVProbit regression but do not include Political Affiliation.

The original

estimated COST savings under the instrumental variable’s regression was $122,652.

The total COST savings after removing Political Affiliation as an

instrument and running a regular probit regression, was -$86,651 which is an
increase of about 29%. Therefore, I use the coefficient of SNAP for the probit
regression of Peptic Ulcer disease to ensure my COST savings estimates are more
accurate, however, it is important to note that the overall impact of the SNAP
direct effect on COST savings is only 0.02%.
Micro Analysis
As noted above, my results indicate that there is evidence that addressing
SDOH by improving Violent Crime, Unemployment and SNAP by one standard

P a g e | 40

deviation will result in hospital cost savings and thereby, increase hospital
profitability. However, this analysis is at the macro level and may not specifically
address the intricacies that exist across all diagnoses within a specific
comorbidity. Some specific diagnoses may be more (or less) sensitive to SDOH
than others. With that understanding I repeat my analysis done on the full
population of this dataset, and run a micro analysis on a specific diagnosis
related group (DRG) to determine if the correlation and causation of SDOH to
hospital COST is still present.
I select an orthopedic procedure, DRG 470 – Major Joint Replacement or
Reattachment of Lower Extremity Without Major Complication or Comorbidity.
This DRG is most synonymous with knee replacements or hip fractures of
patients that are not actively treating any complications or comorbidities at the
time of surgery. Some patients may have a history of comorbidities; however,
the presence of those comorbidities would not influence the surgical procedure.
If the patient is currently treating any chronic conditions or comorbidities with
medication at the time of surgery, DRG 469 – Major Joint Replacement or
Reattachment of Lower Extremity with Major Complication or Comorbidity,
should be used. I chose DRG 470 because the procedure is basic enough that
anybody could receive it regardless of patient’s demographic or socioeconomic
status. It is a standard procedure that is most often performed very similarly
regardless of the patient. The goal of my micro analysis is to determine if there
is a correlation and causal relationship between SDOH and comorbidities and if
there are COST savings being driven by a one standard deviation improvement

P a g e | 41

in SDOH that have nothing to do with the procedure mix. I calculate the COST
savings in the micro analysis the exact same way as the macro analysis, using
the total cost for the DRG 470 dataset which is $3,304,396,448.41.
Appendices 5, 6 and 7 details the results of the regression analysis for
DRG 470. The total number of observations in the DRG 470 subset data is
209,368. I apply the same methodology that was applied in the larger dataset
noted in Appendices 2, 3 and 4 (including the same standard deviations). Violent
Crime (Appendix 5) appears to directly impact Congestive Heart Failure, Diabetes
with no complications, Fluid and Electrolyte Disorders and Weight Loss.

If

Violent Crime improves by one standard deviation, the full range of hospital
COST savings are -$28,463,926 (-0.86% of total cost) to $1,058,154 (0.03% of
total cost) where the $1.06M is the direct COST savings related to the 4 directly
impacted comorbidities and the -$28.5M is the total COST savings. The net
effect of these COST savings is negative which indicates that decreasing Violent
Crime will not result in an increase in hospital cost savings and will not have a
favorable effect on hospital profitability.
SNAP (Appendix 6) has a direct impact on eight comorbidities (Alcohol Abuse,
Chronic Pulmonary Disease, Drug Abuse, Lymphoma, Obesity, Peripheral
Vascular Disorders, Pulmonary Circulation and Renal Failure). The effect of
SNAP on hospital COST savings mirrors what I show from the larger dataset. If
SNAP is improved by one standard deviation, the full range of cost savings are $11,886,339 (-0.36% of total cost) to -$5,667,695 (-0.17% of total cost) where
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the -$5.67M is the direct COST associated with the eight comorbidities and the
-$11.88M is the total COST savings. The net effect of these COST savings is
negative which indicates that an improvement in SNAP will not result in an
increase in hospital cost savings and will not have a favorable effect on hospital
profitability.
Lastly, DRG 470 Unemployment (Appendix 7) directly impacts five
comorbidities (Congestive Heart Failure, Diabetes with no complications, Fluid
and Electrolytes Disorder, Other Neurological Disorders, and Weight Loss). As
with SNAP, Unemployment’s effect on hospital COST savings mirrors the results
found in the larger main analysis above. If Unemployment improves by one
standard deviation, the full range of hospital COST savings are -$29,124,577 (0.88% of total cost) to $7,130,937 (0.22%) where the $7.1M is the direct COST
savings related to the five directly impacted comorbidities and the -$29.1M is the
total COST savings. The net effect of these COST savings is negative which
indicates that an improvement in Unemployment will not result in an increase
in hospital cost savings and will not have a favorable effect on hospital
profitability.
Although the results from the micro analysis does not support the overall
results of the main analysis, it does not invalidate the overall conclusion that
improving SDOH by one standard deviation will result in hospital cost savings.
I used DRG 470 which is used when there are no major complications or
comorbidities present at the time of surgery, therefore, I expected the aggregate
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results from the micro analysis to differ from the main analysis because the
existence of the comorbidities are not as sensitive to how this procedure is
performed or how much it costs in comparison to DRG 469 which includes major
complications and comorbidities at the time to surgery. However, there still
seems to be a correlation and causal relationship between directly impacted
comorbidities and the SDOH resulting in COST savings of 0.03% for Violent
Crime and 0.22% for Unemployment when improving SDOH by one standard.

VI.

Future Research

This paper looks at the impact of Violent Crime, SNAP distributions and
Unemployment on health outcomes and proved that an individual’s exposure to
those social determinants not only causes less than favorable health outcomes,
but also attributes to higher hospital costs and improving those social
determinants will result in cost savings to the hospital. However, these results
in this paper should be cautiously considered given the limitations of available
information from the NIS dataset as well as specific socioeconomic information
that could have been used to provide a more detailed analysis of improvements
in profitability and health outcomes. There is so much information included in
the NIS dataset, the variation of additional analyses on this topic are widespread.
Therefore, I have narrowed it down to a couple of areas that I feel would provide
a richer analysis of the impact of health outcomes and hospital profitability
because of improving SDOH.
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This analysis has some constraints that prevent me from being able to
analyze the information at a more granular level. The NIS dataset does not break
out inpatient discharge data at the state level. The most detailed breakdown
based on geographical information in the NIS dataset is at the Hospital Division
level. Having the hospital inpatient discharge information at the state level and
further, at the zip code level, would provide a clearer picture of how impactful
the area specific SDOH is on an individual’s health outcome. Socioeconomic
factors vary significantly from state to state and city to city, even when those
cities and states have dominant political affiliations in common. Additionally,
the standard deviations at the zip code level and state level may vary from the
Hospital Division level used in this paper. Therefore, to really understand the
impact of potential cost savings resulting from improving SDOH by one standard
deviation, you would need to know the more granular standard deviation.
There could also be some additional research specifically around Safety
Net Hospitals.

Safety Net Hospitals are essential hospitals that provide

healthcare to primarily uninsured, underinsured, and low-income individuals
and those covered by Medicaid. Given the population these hospitals serve, they
are most at risk of skyrocketing costs as they see some of the sickest and poorest
patients. As previous research has shown, a person’s low-income status has an
unfavorable effect on their health outcomes. As a result, the Safety Net Hospitals
would significantly benefit from cost savings derived from improving the SDOH
of the population they serve. All three SDOH indicators used in this paper would
be relevant to use as a basis of analysis since low-income, uninsured individuals

P a g e | 45

are likely to live in areas with higher crimes rates, food insecurity and higher
possibility of being unemployed. Safety Net Hospitals’ primary payer is Medicaid,
which pays close to $0.85-$0.87 on the dollar, and the Disproportionate Share
Hospital Payments10 received from the government that is used to offset the cost
of caring for low-income patients was recently cut and could mean a $44 billion
reduction over the next 10 years, so improving the SDOH for the population they
serve could significantly impact their profitability (Khullar et.al., 2018).
My regression analysis, though informative, is really the first step as it
relates to what could be done to explore opportunities for hospitals to obtain cost
saving by improving SDOH.

The cost regression used the comorbidity’s

coefficients as the base for calculating cost savings.

As mentioned earlier,

comorbidities are present in an individual if they are deemed to have a
comorbidity. Therefore, it would be helpful to interact several comorbidities to
see if it yields a larger comorbidity coefficient.

This would identify the

combination of comorbidities that are driving the cost savings. I tested this
theory by looking at Diabetes with chronic complications (Diabetes) and
Hypertension before and after interaction. When I ran the first cost regression,
the Diabetes coefficient was $103.94, and Hypertension’s coefficient was $46.37.

Violent Crime was shown to cause Diabetes in some respects and

Diabetes attributed to higher cost evidenced by both regression’s coefficients
10

More information on the Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment cuts can be found at
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/payment/cms-finalizes-rule-cuts-medicaid-dsh-payments and
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financial-management/medicaid-disproportionate-share-hospital-dshpayments/index.html
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having the same positive directional impact, so improving Violent Crime would
yield cost savings by the amount of impact Violent Crime had on Diabetes. On
the other hand, Hypertension’s coefficient was -$46.37, which means that
Hypertension alone is not a contributing factor in higher cost, even though
Violent Crime has an impact on Hypertension. However, when I interact both
Diabetes and Hypertension together, that coefficient was $70.25, which tells me
that someone with both Diabetes and Hypertension as comorbidities attributes
to higher healthcare cost, holding all other control variables constant. So,
improving Violent Crime by one standard deviation would improve health
outcomes of people with Diabetes and Hypertension, controlling for all other
independent variables. I would also recommend interacting some comorbidities
against some of the other control variables in the IV analysis such as Race and
Household Income Level.

As evidenced in prior research, certain minority

populations (people of color) are more susceptible to some comorbidities based
on their genetic makeup, or the likelihood that they may live in areas that are
more impacted by socioeconomic factors. Also, a patient’s income level could
have a significant impact on their health outcomes because people are forced to
have to choose between preventive care to keep from being chronically ill in the
future and their livelihood now. Improving SDOH in these cases could possibly
have a significant impact on health outcomes and in turn result in cost savings.
Another direction for future research is to rerun the analysis, taking into
consideration, all SDOH assessed in this paper and additional SDOH not
previously discussed in this paper including residential segregation, lack of
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education/literacy, and early childhood development. There is a possibility that
further analysis could identify additional cost savings when compared to all the
variables originally analyzed. There may also be more significant cost savings
with other SDOH, that may be easier to address for a hospital or health system
than the ones I analyzed in this paper. I also think it would be interesting to see
the impact of how all SDOH combined would impact health outcomes. This
would be done by adding instrumental variables in addition to Political Affiliation
(IV regressions require the same number of instrumental variables as
endogenous variables). By combining multiple SDOH together in one regression,
we could start to piece together what an actual economic policy would look like
related to improving these SDOH and addressing skyrocketing healthcare cost.
VII.

Discussions on Processes and Policy Implications

Next, I address specific recommendations to improve these SDOH to yield
the cost savings.

It is important to note that these process and policy

recommendations are costly, and their cost needs to be considered together with
the cost savings.

Unfortunately, we know that it will take more than the

hospitals to invoke the type of improvements needed socioeconomically to see
the improved health outcomes and increased profitability. However, given the
information provided in this paper, hospitals can play a significant role in
decreasing hospital cost associated with SDOH directly and indirectly.
Direct Efforts
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Studies have shown that hospitals and health systems are starting to
make financial investments in SDOH but the financial weight of those
investments appear to be subpar considering how many hospitals are in the US
and how impactful SDOH can be on their bottom line. There are some good
examples of health systems that are making a deliberate effort to combat SDOH
such as Kaiser Permanente which has invested $200 million to combat
homelessness in Oakland, CA through their Thriving Communities Fund
(Johnson, 2018).

Unfortunately, this level of commitment is not quite

widespread as it should be, and it may be because health systems have not been
able to specifically tie return on investments (ROI) to the financial investments
geared around improving SDOH. Making deliberate financial investments shows
that the health system is dedicated to the cause of addressing SDOH of their
patient population.

According to Horwitz et al., (2020) health systems have

publicly committed to investing in SDOH totaling close to $2.5 billion in the past
two years.

However, their community benefit through subsidized and

uncompensated care (i.e., writing off claims), totaled approximately $60 billion,
with only about 5 percent or less as direct financial investments in activities that
are not specifically health related. From a financial perspective, it is easier to
directly track the ROI from making deliberate financial investments as opposed
to simply writing off unpaid claims or having it covered by charity care.
Another direct way to improve efforts around SDOH is for the health
system to be more pro-active about screening patients when they are being
admitted to the emergency room or for an inpatient stay by utilizing the new
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SDOH diagnosis codes.

Indeed, data collection can be instrumental in

identifying patterns upon admission by directly identifying the socioeconomic
cause, enabling hospitals the opportunity to take swift action in mitigating
unnecessary subsequent visits that could result in increased cost. This would
require providing additional training to front-line workers to be sensitive and
aware of what to look for, what to ask, and how to handle these types of
situations. Health systems can also ramp up their community-health worker
resources. According to the American Public Health Association, Community
Health Worker (CHW) is defined as, “a frontline public health worker who is a
trusted member of and/or has an unusually close understanding of the
community served. This trusting relationship enables the worker to serve as a
liaison/link/intermediary between health/social services and the community to
facilitate access to services and improve the quality and cultural competence of
service delivery” (APHA, n.d.). Hiring people whose primary job’s responsibility
is to address SDOH of the patient is key to early high cost mitigation and
improved health outcomes. CHWs can also work in collaboration with the
provider (i.e., doctors) to help identify patients that may be more susceptible to
SDOH. Often time, providers only come in at the highest cost point which is
when the patient has been admitted to the emergency room or for an inpatient
stay.

Providers collaborating with the CHW can help mitigate overuse of

inpatient services by identify issues that may be causing some of the acute
reasons for admission.
Indirect Efforts
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Cross-functional collaboration is a must for health systems to really reap
the cost savings derived from improving SDOH. In addition to all the direct
efforts noted above, health systems will need to look beyond their walls for
assistance to combat these SDOH that are driving up cost and causing less than
favorable health outcomes.

One way to do this is to establish and improve

relationships with community organizations with a specific focus on SDOH. This
can be done by financially supporting some of those organizations’ initiatives or
collaborating with the organizations on those initiatives. An example would be
ProMedica, an Ohio based health system that co-founded the Root Cause
Coalition, a non-for-profit collaborative of health systems, health insurance
companies, and community organizations geared around addressing causes of
health inequity (Johnson, 2018, p.8). These types of investments allow dual
benefits as it helps solidify the health system’s position on moral and social
responsibility to the community they serve, and it will ultimately improve their
profitability as discussed in this paper.
Health systems should also ensure that their interest around SDOH are
legislatively represented. In addition to securing lobbyist to address restrictions
around healthcare reimbursement rates from government and commercial
insurance payers, they should also ensure their interest is represented in other
areas that may not directly affect healthcare economic policy but directly affects
socioeconomic factors. This may include supporting candidates with platforms
geared around improving the SDOH that are most impactful to the communities
served by the health system. This could be a controversial suggestion especially
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in today’s climate; however, this paper empirically proves that political affiliation
is a driver for the elasticity of hospital cost savings because of improved SDOH.
Also, linking socioeconomic policies to health outcomes is not a new
phenomenon.

Adler and Newman (2002) discussed several policies that are

designed to directly impact an individual’s socioeconomic status such as labormarket policies, redistributive policies and policies affecting environmental
exposures to name a few.
Labor market policies are geared around improving overall labor market
outcomes while supporting and protecting the workers. Some policies related to
labor market would be the fight for livable wages (i.e., increasing minimum
wage), unemployment insurance, and transitions from manual low-skilled labor
to STEM. Redistributive polices are policies where government funds are used
to invest in reducing economic inequalities. Sometimes these types of polices
can be looked at as being extreme liberal/socialist leaning, but this is not a new
or extreme idea. As a matter of fact, programs like Head Start11, food stamps
and even Medicare can be viewed as redistributive policies. These policies allow
low-income individuals to have an opportunity to be at the same level playing
field as higher income individuals, thereby eliminating detrimental disparities
that can negatively affect health outcomes.

Policies affecting environmental

exposures primarily consist of policies that aim to limit or eliminate pollution,
promote clean air, and clean energy, and climate change. Often time, people of
11

According to Benefits.gov, “Head Start is a Federal program that promotes the school readiness of children from
birth to age five from low-income families by enhancing their cognitive, social, and emotional development. More
details on program can be found at https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/616
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color and low-income individuals live in areas that are highly impacted by
hazardous environmental pollutants that ultimately have a negative effect on
health outcomes. These policies amongst others, are not specifically healthcare
policies but can impact an individual’s health care.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that SDOH causes unfavorable
health outcomes which causes hospital inpatient cost to increase attributing to
the erosion of hospital profitability. If the circumstances around those SDOH
were improved, hospital profitability would improve. I assume that since the
SDOH causes unfavorable effects on health outcomes, the improvements of those
SDOH would improve health outcomes.

Overall, I conclude that improving

Violent Crime, SNAP and Unemployment by one standard deviation will result in
hospital cost savings as follows: total hospital cost would decrease between
0.16% and 0.21% for Violent Crime, up to 0.5% for SNAP and between 1.2% and
1.7% for unemployment resulting in a favorable impact on hospital profitability.
The dataset used in this analysis prevented me from being able to go more
granular, so more detailed analysis at the state, city and zip code level would
give a more precise estimation of possible cost savings related to SDOH
improvements. This paper introduces IV analysis and found endogeneity with
the SDOH variables and uses political affiliation as the instrument to isolate the
exogenous portion of the SDOH.
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There are few studies, if any, that directly ties the improvement of SDOH
to hospital profitability. However, based on the findings in this paper, causality
between SDOH and hospital cost has been established. The future research in
this area would be vital for all hospitals and health systems and has the potential
to change the trajectory of a plummeting bottom line.
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